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U.S. Exceptionalism and the Strengthening Process  
of the Inter-American Human Rights System
by Francisco J. Rivera Juaristi*
“Our refusal to join in the international implementation of the 
principles we so loudly and frequently proclaim cannot help but 
give the impression that we do not practice what we preach . . . . 
[W]e seriously undermine our own case when we resist joining 
in the international endeavor to enforce these rights, which we 
ourselves had so much to do with launching.” (Charles Yost, 
former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations)1
IntroductIon
The current reform process of the Inter-American Human Rights System (IAHRS, System) has as much to do with evaluating the role of the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights (Commission, IACHR) in promoting and 
protecting human rights in the region as it does with criticiz-
ing and rejecting U.S. exceptionalism2 in matters of regional 
human rights law. All of the Spanish-speaking Member States of 
the Organization of American States 
(OAS), as well as Brazil, Haiti, and 
several English-speaking Caribbean 
States, have at one point3 ratified 
the American Convention on Human 
Rights (American Convention).4 Most 
OAS Member States have ratified at 
least one or more additional regional 
human rights treaties.5 All OAS 
Member States, except two, have rati-
fied the Inter-American Convention 
on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against 
Women (Convention of Belém do Pará). The United States has not 
ratified any of the OAS regional human rights treaties. This lack of 
universal ratification of regional human rights treaties raises seri-
ous questions about the effectiveness and legitimacy of the System.
This article urges the United States to pay its true debt to 
the Inter-American Human Rights System by fully engaging 
the System and by finally ratifying the American Convention 
on Human Rights. First, the article addresses regional criticisms 
over U.S. exceptionalism within the Inter-American System. 
Second, the article describes how this criticism has prompted 
increased support for the creation of alternatives to the Inter-
American Human Rights System that would exclude U.S. 
participation. Third, it addresses the principal apprehensions 
to U.S. ratification of the American Convention and argues 
that such concerns are not insurmountable. Finally, the article 
concludes that ratification of the American Convention by the 
United States is necessary to prevent further erosion of the 
Inter-American Human Rights System and of U.S. leadership 
in the region.
regIonal crItIcISm oVer u.S. excePtIonalISm wIthIn 
the Inter-amerIcan SyStem
Influential regional figures, such as Venezuelan President 
Hugo Chávez, Ecuadorean President Rafael Correa, and Bolivian 
President Evo Morales, have taken issue with the role the United 
States plays in the System. In a not-so-
subtle jab at the United States, they 
have characterized the System as a tool 
used and manipulated by “imperial 
powers”6 who refuse to play by the 
same rules as other states in the 
region. Venezuela’s President Hugo 
Chávez justified the state’s decision 
to denounce the American Convention 
on grounds of reciprocity and lack of 
mutuality between all OAS Member 
States. He questioned why Venezuela should continue to be 
bound by a treaty that does not bind all other OAS Member 
States. At the 2012 OAS General Assembly in Cochabamba, 
these States, as well as Nicaragua, publicly criticized the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights for allegedly turning 
a blind eye to human rights violations in the United States.7 In 
his opening speech at that General Assembly, Bolivian President 
Evo Morales said that the OAS had two options: “it either dies 
as a servant of the [U.S.] empire or revives to serve all of the 
nations of the Americas[.]”8 Ecuador’s President Rafael Correa 
echoed President Morales’ views.9
Although such rhetoric is uncharacteristic in modern diplo-
matic discourse, it has been well received by the strong popular 
bases that brought these presidents to power. For them, the 
underlying issues that feed the reform process are concerns 
about universality and mutuality of obligations within the Inter-
American System. While mutuality and reciprocity arguments 
technically do not apply in the context of human rights treaties 
(because these treaties are not between two or more parties, 
but rather involve obligations between each State Party and 
those under its jurisdiction), such arguments are still very much 
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Who would not be offended 
by the idea that not all states are 
equal under the law; that — in 
the words of George Orwell — 
some are more equal than others?
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persuasive in the court of public opinion. Who would not be 
offended by the idea that not all states are equal under the law; 
that — in the words of George Orwell — some are more equal 
than others? In fact, “imperialistic” and populist anti-yankee 
oratory aside, these presidents may be making a rather legitimate 
argument; namely, that if the System is to be effective for some 
Member States, it has to have legally 
binding authority over all states.
The United States defends itself 
against these criticisms by mentioning 
that the Commission has “jurisdic-
tion” over human rights violations 
committed within the United States 
by virtue of the OAS Charter and in 
light of U.S. commitments under the 
American Declaration on the Rights 
and Duties of Man.10 But full mem-
bership in the System requires much 
more than that.11 Participation in 
hearings before the Commission is 
not enough. The System has two 
main organs (the Commission and the Court) and five major 
human rights treaties (and a Protocol). The United States has not 
ratified any of these treaties and barely engages with only one of 
the System’s organs.
This idea that the United States must fully participate and 
be accountable before the Inter-American System on an equal 
footing with other OAS Member States is one that resonates 
with most observers, participants, and supporters of the System. 
Despite the fervent opposition that civil society organizations 
have displayed against the Venezuelan and Ecuadorean propos-
als during the current reform process, most — if not all — sup-
port their call in favor of U.S. ratification of the American 
Convention. CEJIL (an influential NGO in the region), for 
example, has been very critical of some of the proposals put 
forward by states like Venezuela and Ecuador that it considers 
may in fact “weaken” rather than “strengthen” the System, but 
it has also agreed with those states’ call in favor of universality 
and, more specifically, it has agreed with the need for the United 
States to ratify the American Convention. In every opportunity 
where the issue has come up, whether in forums organized 
by the Commission or by academic institutions like American 
University, or even in events organized by the OAS Permanent 
Council, there is widespread support for the universal ratifica-
tion of the American Convention by all OAS Member States, but 
especially by the United States.
For example, hundreds of human rights defenders, including 
former presidents of Colombia, Peru, and Ecuador, have signed 
the Bogotá Declaration, which expresses support for the Inter-
American System. This Declaration includes a demand that the 
“States of the region ratify the Inter-American conventions on 
human rights as a clear demonstration of their political will to 
support the [Inter-American System].” It also specifically urges 
“the government of the United States of America to ratify the 
American Convention on Human Rights.”12
The Inter-American Commission shares the concerns put 
forward by many Member States and users of the System con-
cerning the lack of universal treaty ratification in the region. 
The Commission has established “universal acceptance of the 
regional human rights instruments” as one of its strategic objec-
tives for 2011–15. Accordingly, the Commission has announced 
it will focus on promoting universal ratification of these instru-
ments and that in 2013, it will write a report on the consequences 
of the fact that not all Member States, including the United 
States, have ratified the American 
Convention and other Inter-American 
human rights treaties.13
The call for U.S. ratification of 
the American Convention has gotten 
louder due to the current debate about 
the future of the Inter-American 
System. States, NGOs, individuals, 
academics, and the Inter-American 
Commission, are calling for uni-
versal ratification of the American 
Convention and other regional 
human rights treaties as a way of 
ensuring that the System is strong for 
all and not just for some. The absence 
of U.S. leadership in this area has affected credibility and public 
confidence in the System.
ProPoSalS for the creatIon of alternatIVeS to the 
Inter-amerIcan human rIghtS SyStem that would 
exclude u.S. PartIcIPatIon
Criticism over U.S. exceptionalism in the region has included 
proposals that include not only modification of the current 
System,14 but also the creation of alternatives to the Inter-
American Human Rights System that would exclude the United 
States (and Canada).15 Such efforts to exclude the United 
States from participating in regional organizations are currently 
underway.
For example, the Community of Latin American and 
Caribbean States (CELAC) was created in 2010 and has a mem-
bership of 33 Latin American and Caribbean states. It purposely 
excludes the United States and Canada.16 Despite CELAC being 
a newcomer in the region, Ecuador has suggested that all OAS 
functions be “absorbed by CELAC.”17
Ecuador has also suggested18 that a human rights super-
visory organ be created under the auspices of the Unión de 
Naciones Suramericanas (Union of South American Nations, 
UNASUR).19 The influence of UNASUR in the current debate 
about the OAS should not be underestimated. During the 
November 2012 Meeting of UNASUR Heads of State, all twelve 
Member States,20 with the exception of Venezuela,21 approved 
a proposal to request the OAS Secretary General to convoke a 
meeting of the 25 States Parties22 to the American Convention 
to be held prior to the upcoming March 2013 OAS Special 
General Assembly, with the purpose of discussing reforms to 
the Inter-American System.23 That is, twelve influential OAS 
Member States agreed to exclude the United States from par-
ticipating in a meeting about the System because the United 
States is not a State Party to the American Convention. Other 
regional initiatives that exclude the United States, such as the 
Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América 
(Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America, ALBA)24 
What is certain is that [. . .] 
the current reform process of the 
Inter-American System is being 
fueled, at least in part, by the 
desire to limit U.S. influence over 
the System and by resentment 
against U.S. exceptionalism.
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and the Cumbres Iberoamericana de Jefes de Estado y de 
Gobierno (Ibero-American Conference for Heads of States and 
Government),25 are also gaining momentum.
It is unclear how or whether these new regional institu-
tions will substitute the role the Inter-American Human Rights 
System has played in promoting and protecting human rights 
in the Americas. What is certain is that the creation of CELAC 
and ALBA, as well as the aforementioned initiatives within 
UNASUR, demonstrate that the current reform process of the 
Inter-American System is being fueled, at least in part, by the 
desire to limit U.S. influence over the System and by resentment 
against U.S. exceptionalism.26
The United States should not underestimate the effects 
the current reform process of the Inter-American System may 
have on U.S. influence over the region. Unless the Obama 
Administration takes bold and comprehensive action to fully 
engage with the Inter-American System, the United States risks 
further erosion of its moral authority as a regional leader in the 
protection of human rights.
aPPrehenSIonS regardIng u.S. ratIfIcatIon of the 
amerIcan conVentIon
Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter recently raised the issue 
of universality in an op-ed stating: “[T]he universality of human 
rights could be achieved if all OAS Member States ratified the 
[American] Convention. Universal participation in our hemi-
spheric human rights bodies would affirm and strengthen our 
democracies’ commitment to protect human rights.”27
President Carter signed the American Convention in 1977. At 
the signing ceremony, he stated, “[T]his blank space on the page 
has been here for a long time, and it’s with a great deal of plea-
sure that I sign on behalf of the United States this Convention.”28 
President Carter then requested the U.S. Senate’s consent with 
the following statement:
By giving its advice and consent to ratification of [the 
American Convention], the Senate will confirm our 
country’s traditional commitment to the promotion 
and protection of human rights at home and abroad. 
I recommend that the Senate give prompt consider-
ation to the treaties and advice and consent to their 
ratification.29
In 1979, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held 
hearings on this issue30 but did not take any further action. 
Thirty-five years have passed since President Carter signed 
the American Convention, and the Senate still has not given its 
consent.31
Apprehensions about ratification of the American Convention 
can be divided into three categories.32 First, there are federal-
ism concerns about how ratification could authorize federal 
encroachment into matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of 
states. Second, there are sovereignty concerns about whether 
international legal obligations may interfere with exclusively 
domestic affairs. Third, there are concerns about the interpreta-
tion of the right to life under the American Convention and its 
compatibility with U.S. laws on the death penalty and abortion.
The underlying problem with the first two concerns is the 
erroneous presumption that human rights are exclusively of 
state or domestic concern. Human rights are inherently of con-
cern to the international community. International human rights 
law complements domestic norms and mechanisms where the 
latter inadequately protect or fail to guarantee human dignity. 
The purpose for the creation and development of international 
human rights law was precisely to ensure that basic human 
dignity would not be a subject matter of exclusive concern of 
governments, whether they are state, local, or federal in nature. 
In any case, during the negotiation phase of the treaty draft-
ing process the United States was able to include a federalism 
clause in Article 28 of the American Convention, which rec-
ognizes that some provisions of the Convention fall under the 
jurisdiction of the federal government and others fall under the 
jurisdiction of the “constituent units of the federal state.”33 This 
clause addresses U.S. concerns about the “federalization” of 
issues of state concern from a domestic law perspective.34 
This clause, however, would not relieve the U.S. federal 
government from international responsibility that arises out of 
state and local conduct that is incompatible with the American 
Convention. General principles of international law establish 
that treaty obligations are binding on all government actors, 
including state and local officials in federalist forms of govern-
ment.35 Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela, for example, 
are all States Parties to the American Convention and they all 
have a federalist government structure.36 The Inter-American 
Commission and the Court have declared all four of these federal 
states internationally responsible for violations of the American 
Convention for actions that involved state, provincial or local 
authorities. Federalism, therefore, does not shield the conduct of 
its “constituent units” from international responsibility.37 Thus, 
U.S. ratification of the American Convention would not require 
a federalization of matters that fall under the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of local states, but ratification of this treaty would indicate 
that state or federal conduct could give rise to the international 
liability of the United States.  
It is worth noting that ratification of the American Convention 
would not automatically grant the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights jurisdiction over the United States. Pursuant to 
Article 62 of the American Convention, the Inter-American 
Court can only exercise jurisdiction over those States Parties that 
have additionally recognized the Court’s jurisdiction. Thus, the 
United States can ratify the American Convention without neces-
sarily having to recognize the Court’s jurisdiction. Nevertheless, 
although this additional step is completely voluntary in nature, 
U.S. recognition of the Court’s jurisdiction would not only be 
the right thing to do, but it would also send the right message to 
others states in the region.
The third category of concerns regarding U.S. ratification of 
the American Convention has to do with the interpretation of the 
right to life as recognized in Article 4 of the treaty. Specifically, 
issues involving the death penalty and abortion are the two main 
concerns that seem, at least at first glance, to be problematic. 
Nevertheless, a closer examination suggests that such concerns 
are also without merit.
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Article 4 of the American Convention recognizes the right to 
life “in general, from the moment of conception.” This language 
raises concerns that ratification of this treaty could result in a 
prohibition of legal abortions in the United States. The “legisla-
tive” history and subsequent interpretation of this text suggests 
that ratification of this treaty would not affect the right to have 
an abortion, nor the right to life of the unborn as understood in 
the United States.
U.S. laws on abortion are compatible with the American 
Convention. In the “Baby Boy Case” against the United States, 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights clearly 
rejected the petitioners’ argument that the American Convention 
recognizes an absolute right to life 
from the moment of conception, 
but it also rejected the argument 
that the Convention recognizes an 
absolute right to have an abortion 
regardless of the circumstances.38 
The Commission highlighted that the 
phrase “in general” was included in 
the text of Article 4 of the Convention 
to accommodate those OAS Member 
States that, like the United States, 
allow abortions under certain cir-
cumstances.39 Ratification of the 
American Convention, therefore, 
would not modify U.S. laws on abortion and, therefore, efforts 
to prevent ratification of the American Convention on the basis 
of this issue are misguided.
Objections to ratification of the American Convention based 
on concerns about the death penalty are equally misplaced. The 
American Convention does not prohibit the death penalty per 
se. There is an additional protocol to the American Convention40 
that OAS Member States can ratify if they want to show their 
binding commitment to the abolition of the death penalty, but the 
American Convention itself does not abolish the death penalty. 
Ratification of the American Convention would not require the 
U.S. to abolish the death penalty.
Those provisions of the American Convention limiting the 
application of the death penalty are essentially compatible with 
current U.S. law.41 These limitations include the following: the 
imposition of the death penalty only for “the most serious crimes 
and pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent court 
and in accordance with a law establishing such punishment, 
enacted prior to the commission of the crime;” a prohibition 
on extension of the death penalty to crimes to which it does 
not apply at the time of treaty ratification; a prohibition on the 
reestablishment of the death penalty once it has been abolished; 
a prohibition of its application to political offenses; a prohibi-
tion of the penalty’s application to persons under eighteen or 
over seventy at the time the crime was committed, and pregnant 
women; and a recognition of the right of every person con-
demned to death to apply for amnesty, pardon, or commutation 
of sentence. Nothing in this list of restrictions is incompatible 
with current U.S. federal or state law, especially since the U.S. 
Supreme Court decided in the 2005 Roper v. Simmons case that 
execution of juvenile offenders (those under the age of eighteen) 
was unconstitutional.
Should the United States choose to ratify the American 
Convention, it would not be the only State Party in which the 
death penalty is still legal. Guatemala, Jamaica, Barbados, 
Dominica, and Trinidad and Tobago all ratified the American 
Convention even though at the time of ratification the death pen-
alty was a legal form of punishment in those states.42 Guatemala, 
Barbados, Dominica, and Trinidad and Tobago43 included res-
ervations to various aspects of Article 4 when they ratified the 
American Convention.
Both President Carter44 and the American Bar Association45 
have suggested that the U.S. Senate give its consent to ratifi-
cation of the American Convention subject to several reser-
vations,46 thus limiting the domes-
tic effect of the most controversial 
aspects of the American Convention. 
Many other States Parties have added 
such reservations to their ratifica-
tion documents.47 The United States 
could similarly ratify the American 
Convention and include reserva-
tions48 to Article 4 or to other articles 
thereof, so long as the reservations 
conform to the provisions of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties.49 That is, so long as the res-
ervation is compatible with the object 
and purpose of the treaty.50
In light of these considerations, continued apprehensions 
about U.S. ratification of the American Convention seem to be 
based on political reasons and a belief in U.S. exceptionalism, 
rather than on legal hurdles. Issues of federalism and self-exe-
cution51 of treaties pose no more legal obstacle to ratification 
of the American Convention than they did to ratification of the 
ICCPR. Thus, there seems to be no insurmountable legal objec-
tion for U.S. ratification of the American Convention.
eroSIon of regIonal u.S. leaderShIP  
In human rIghtS
The year 2013 marks the 44th anniversary of the adoption of 
the American Convention in 1969, and the 35th anniversary of 
its entry into force in 1978. The United States actively partici-
pated in the drafting process of the American Convention.52 It 
now needs to ratify it.
It is time to move past the lingering fears reminiscent of 
the Bricker Amendment era, when suspicion over international 
treaties moved us closer to international isolationism.53 Human 
rights treaties are here to stay, and while most of the states in 
the region have moved with the tide of the times, the United 
States still needs to join them. The United States led the way in 
developing and defining those minimum standards and should 
consequently lead the way in adhering to them as well.
In a move reminiscent of Cold War-era paranoia, the U.S. 
Senate recently voted not to ratify the UN Convention on the 
Rights of Persons With Disabilities because conservatives were 
deeply suspicious of the United Nations and argued that the 
treaty could relinquish U.S. sovereignty to a UN committee.54 
By not ratifying even the most non-justiciable human rights 
It is time to move past the 
lingering fears reminiscent of 
the Bricker Amendment era, 
when suspicion over international 
treaties moved us closer to 
international isolationism.
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concluSIon and recommendatIonS
U.S. exceptionalism has left the Inter-American Human 
Rights System vulnerable to attacks aimed at undermining its 
legitimacy and credibility. The current reform process of the 
System presents an opportunity for the United States to take 
stronger actions to restore public confidence in the System (and 
in the OAS) and prevent the creation of parallel human rights 
supervisory organs that lack independence and autonomy. The 
United States should lead by example by engaging more actively 
with the Commission and by ratifying the American Convention 
on Human Rights and other regional human rights treaties.57 
Public confidence in the System depends on whether it can be 
seen as an effective body that supervises human rights violations 
in all OAS Member States, including the United States.
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